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 The Dynamic Behavior of Efficient Timber Prices 
 
Abstract:  The problem of when to optimally harvest trees when timber prices evolve 
according to an exogenous stochastic process has been studied extensively in recent 
decades.  However, little attention has been given to the appropriate form of the 
stochastic process for timber prices, despite the fact that the choice of a process has 
important effects on optimal harvesting decisions.  We develop a simple theoretical 
model of a timber market and show that there exists a rational expectations equilibrium in 
which prices evolve according to a stationary ARMA(1,1) process.  Simulations are used 
to analyze a model with a more general representation of timber stock dynamics and to 
demonstrate that the unconditional distribution for rational timber prices is asymmetric.  
Implications for the optimal harvesting literature are: 1) market efficiency provides little 
justification for random walk prices, 2) unit root tests, used to analyze the informational 
efficiency of timber markets, do not distinguish between efficient and inefficient markets, 
and 3) failure to recognize asymmetric disturbances in time-series analyses of historical 
timber prices can lead to sub-optimal harvesting rules. 
 
 
  2The Dynamic Behavior of Efficient Timber Prices 
Introduction 
In recent decades, the problem of when to optimally harvest trees when timber 
prices (and other components of forestry profits) are uncertain has received a great deal 
of attention.
1  In these studies, price is assumed to evolve according to an exogenous 
stochastic process, and the corresponding dynamic optimization problem is solved to 
yield an optimal harvesting rule.  The form of the stochastic price process differs across 
studies.  Some researchers have analyzed non-stationary random walk processes (e.g., 
geometric Brownian motion), while others have examined stationary autoregressive and 
serially uncorrelated processes.  The basic insight provided by these studies is that, in 
most of the cases examined
2, optimal harvesting involves the use of a reservation price 
rule whereby timber managers harvest when price climbs above a reservation price and, 
otherwise, delay harvest and revisit the decision in the next period.  It is shown that a 
reservation price rule weakly dominates a fixed-rotation rule consisting of Faustmann 
rotations evaluated at the mean of the price process. 
The central question addressed in this study is:  what is the appropriate model of 
timber prices?  This is an important question given the prescriptive nature of the timber 
                                                 
1 A representative, but but no means exhaustive, list of studies is Norstrom (1975), Brazee and Mendelsohn 
(1988), Morck et al. (1989), Clarke and Reed (1989), Haight and Holmes (1991), Haight and Smith (1991), 
Lohmander (1992), Thomson (1992), Reed (1993), Yin and Newman (1997), Plantinga (1998), Gong 
(1999), and Saphores et al. (2002).  These studies complement the literatures on renewable and 
nonrenewable resource use under uncertainty (e.g., Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; 
Pindyck, 1984) and irreversible land development under uncertainty (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Fisher and 
Hanemann, 1986; Albers, 1996). 
2 The exception is when prices follow a random walk process and timber production involves no fixed costs 
(see, for example, Thomson, 1992). 
  3harvesting literature
3 and evidence that the form of the price process strongly influences 
the performance of a reservation price rule relative to the Faustmann rotation (Haight and 
Holmes, 1991; Plantinga, 1998).  Nonetheless, most authors appear to select the form of 
the price process for analytical convenience.  When justification for the process is 
offered, one of two general arguments have been made.  First, some authors have argued 
for random walk processes on the grounds that such prices are consistent with an 
informationally efficient timber market (Thomson, 1992; Reed, 1993).  In the same vein, 
a number of authors have tested the hypothesis of efficient timber markets by applying 
unit root and other tests to time-series data on timber prices (Washburn and Binkley, 
1990; Haight and Holmes, 1991; Hultkrantz, 1993; Yin and Newman, 1995; Abildtrup et 
al., 1997).  The motivation for these studies is the claim that harvesting rules can work 
only if markets are inefficient since they rely on predictable price movements.  Second, 
some authors take an empirical approach and fit time-series models to historical price 
series (Haight and Holmes, 1991; Gong, 1999; Saphores et al. 2002). 
The objective of this paper is to examine the theoretical foundations for timber 
price dynamics.  We focus on the use of relatively young forests, as distinct from the 
problem of extracting old-growth timber consider by Reed (1993) and Sapphores et al. 
(2002).  With young forests, growth in the resource becomes a central feature of the 
problem and, as we show, has important implications for price dynamics.  In the next 
section, we develop a simple model of a competitive timber market and examine the 
stochastic properties of efficient prices generated in this setting.  In our model, 1) timber 
                                                 
3 Particularly in studies published in forestry journals, authors advocate the use of reservation price rules by 
timber managers.  For example, Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) write, “When market demand and supply 
conditions are such that timber prices are relative high, individual land owners should respond by cutting 
more.  By tailoring harvests to variations in prices, the present value of all future timber revenues can be 
greatly enhanced over the standard Faustmann model.”  
  4managers are price-takers with rational expectations who maximize the present 
discounted value of expected timber revenues over an infinite horizon, 2) timber demand 
is subject to exogenous i.i.d. shocks, and 3) the stock of timber evolves according to 
harvesting and a deterministic growth function.  We show that under the stated model 
assumptions there exists near a perfect foresight steady-state a unique stationary rational 
expectations equilibrium that can be completely represented by a stationary ARMA(1,1) 
price process.  This result indicates that stationary serially-correlated prices can arise in 
an informationally efficient timber market even when market shocks are i.i.d.  Thus, our 
theoretical results indicate that market efficiency provides little justification for random 
walk prices and that the unit root tests applied in earlier studies do not distinguish 
between informationally efficient and inefficient markets for timber. 
In the following section, simulations are employed to analyze a more general 
model of the timber market.  In contrast to the theoretical model in which the timber 
inventory is represented by a single stock variable, we consider a more standard age-class 
inventory model.  The model is used to simulate long sequences of prices, which, 
consistent with our theoretical results, display the features of a stationary and serially 
dependent price process.  Moreover, simulations are used to show that the unconditional 
price distribution is asymmetric.  A similar result is produced in models of optimal 
commodity storage (e.g., Williams and Wright, 1991), and is a consequence of stock-outs 
(depletion of the inventory).  In contrast, price asymmetry in our model arises from the 
concavity of the growth function.  This result indicates that researchers who rely on 
empirical evidence to justify a stochastic process for timber prices should exercise 
caution in fitting models to historical price series since the assumption of symmetric 
  5disturbances, adopted in all previous studies, may not hold.  Incorrectly assuming 
symmetric disturbances can result in sub-optimal harvesting rules.  These and other 
implications of our results are discussed in greater detail in the final section of the paper. 
 
A Model of an Efficient Timber Market 
In this section, we explore the dynamics of timber prices in a rational expectations 
equilibrium.  Our purpose is to demonstrate that stationary and serially correlated prices 
can be generated even in a very simple market environment.  By focusing on a simple 
model, we can derive concise analytical results and elucidate the factors determining the 
behavior of efficient prices.  Simulations are used in the following section to examine 
price dynamics in a more complex setting.  Our model has a similar structure to the 
models of competitive storage analyzed by Williams and Wright (1991) and Deaton and 
Laroque (1992, 1996), except that the resource in our model exhibits stock-dependent 
growth.  As well, our model can be viewed as a stochastic version of Berck’s (1981) 
model of a renewable resource market. 
 
Agent Behavior 
Agents in the market are timber growers who each have access to a stock that 
evolves according to a deterministic growth function.  At each time t, agents choose some 
portion of the stock to sell in a competitive market, subject to the constraint that the 
quantity harvested ( ) cannot exceed the available stock (s ); that is,  .  The stock 
remaining after harvest, defined as 
t q t t qs ≥ t
t   tt x sq ≡ − , (1) 
  6grows according to the increasing and concave function  .  Thus, the deterministic 
stock dynamics in our model may be summarized as, 
( ) t gx
  1 () tt sx g x + t = + . (2) 
In the forest economics literature, timber volume is more commonly modeled as a 
function of the age of a timber stand.  If a forest is composed of multiple stands of 
varying ages, then in general there is not a unique correspondence between total timber 
volume and timber growth.  For simplicity, we ignore the age composition of the forest 
and treat the timber resource as homogeneous.  In the simulations presented below, a 
more conventional age-class model of the timber resource is considered. 
Timber is competitively supplied by n agents.  Aggregate demand for timber is 
stochastic (see below) and, thus, risk-neutral agents will maximize expected discounted 
profits.  By assuming that agents are identical, we can focus on the optimal supply 
decision for a single, representative timber grower.  Specifically, the representative agent 




























where β is the discount factor,  t p  is the price of timber, and timber management costs are 
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  7In what follows, we focus on the interior solution to the representative agent problem, 
and, thus, equation 3a is the relevant behavioral equation.
4  It says that agents will supply 
timber up to the point where the marginal benefit of selling in time t equals the 
discounted expected marginal benefit of selling in t+1, taking into account the growth in 
the stock between t and t+1.  Conditions required for an interior solution to exist are 
discussed below.  In the simulations section we consider corner solutions as well; that is, 
we solve the model with a version of equation 3b included. 
 
Market Equilibrium 
The supply of timber is determined by the agent’s Euler equation (3a) and the 
stock dynamics in (2).  Demand for timber is exogenous and subject to stochastic shocks 
transmitted through output markets for wood products.  Inverse demand is denoted, 
 (, tt pD n q) t ε =  (4) 
where  t ε  is an i.i.d. shock with known distribution.  A rational expecations equilibrium 
(REE) of this model is a 4-tuple of stochastic processes {  that simultaneously 
satisfy equations (1), (2), (3a), and (4).  Unfortunately, systems of non-linear, 
expectational difference equations cannot, in general, be solved.  Instead, the standard 
approach in the macroeconomics literature on real business cycles (e.g., Kydland and 
Prescott, 1982; Farmer, 1999) is to log-linearize the system of equations about a perfect 
foresight steady-state.  The idea is simple.  If there is a perfect foresight steady-state, then 
the linearization about that steady-state should well approximate the local dynamic 
, , , } ttt t sqxp
                                                 
4 Here, we are considering the case in which stock-outs ( 0 t x = ) do not occur; we are not assuming that 
they cannot occur.  If this were the case, timber would not be scarce and there would be no basis for 
positive prices. 
  8behavior.  If the steady-state is also robust to small perturbations, then adding stochastic 
shocks with small support should not cause the system to deviate from the neighborhood 
in which the approximation is valid.  Once the linearization is complete, results from the 
literature on multivariate linear expectational difference equations may be applied to 
obtain the REE.  Complete details on the procedure can be found in Evans and 
Honkaponja (2001). 
We begin by identifying the perfect foresight steady-state.  The demand shock is 
assumed to equal its mean value, denoted ε .  In the steady-state, prices are constant and, 
thus, the Euler equation (3a) implies 1' ( ) 1 / gx β + = , where barred variables will 
represent their steady-state values.  The invertibility of  ' pins down  g x  and the steady-
state values of stock, harvest, and price are subsequently given by  () qg x = , sx q =+, 
and  (, pD n q) ε = , respectively.  Existence of an economically reasonable steady-state is 
not guaranteed; that is, a steady-state with  0 p > .  It is clear that for most reasonable 
specifications of g, a positive x  will obtain and yield reasonable (positive) values of s  
and q .  However, for a given demand specification, large values of q  could result in 
negative steady-state prices.  This issue will be considered in greater depth in an example 
provided below. 
We are now in a position to obtain the linearized model by taking a Taylor series 
expansion about the steady-state.  For equation (3a), the first-order expansion is, 
1 ( ) (1 '( )) ''( )( ) (1 '( )) ( ) tt t t p p p gxp gxx xp gxEp p β ββ + +−=+ + − ++ − . 
Noting that  (1 '( )) p gxp β =+  and expressing variables as percent deviations from their 
steady-state values (indicated by hats), we obtain, 
  1 ˆˆ ''( ) tt t ˆ t p Ep x g xx β + = +  (5) 
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where   is the partial derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to the ith 
argument and 
i D
ˆt ε  is the percent deviation from its mean. 
We next compute a simplified reduced form for our model and analyze the REE.  

















where  ''( ) 0 xg x α β =< ,  1 1' ( ) gx 0 γ =+ > ,  21 /( ( , )) 0 px n D n q γ ε = −> , and 
21 ˆ ˆ (, ) / ( (, ) ) t D nq xnD nq t µ εε ε = ε
1
 .  A REE of the model may be obtained by finding a 
stationary solution to the linear expectational difference equation (7).  A REE, however, 
may not exist and, even if it does, the equilibrium may not be unique.  If a unique REE 
exists, then the model is said to be determinate.  Whether or not the model is determinate 
depends on the magnitude of certain eigenvalues (details are found in Appendix A).  We 
have the following proposition regarding the determinacy of the model: 
Proposition 1.  If the steady-state is economically reasonable, then the model is 




12 (1 ) 4 γ αγ γ +− > ; (8) 
 
otherwise, no equilibrium exists. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  The proof is omitted, but available from the authors upon 
request.  The restriction in (8) is equivalent to the assumption that the eigenvalues  i λ  
(see Appendix A) are real. 
 
  10If the steady-state parameters are economically reasonable and the reduced-form 
parameters satisfy (8), then the unique REE may be obtained using standard techniques, 


















Equation (9) could be placed in standard VAR form, but the one-dimensional nature of 
the dynamics permits a simple ARMA(1,1) representation, as follows: 
  11 2 1 1 2 1 12 ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) tt t pp ˆ t γ φγ φ φ γ µ φµ −− =+ +− + . (10) 
We conclude that, provided an interior steady-state exists, the associated unique efficient 
stationary price process will have an ARMA(1,1) structure. 
Before providing an example, two points about the solution are noted.  First, the 
above analysis was conducted under the assumption that an interior solution to the 
agent’s optimization problem exists.  Now notice that if a reasonable steady-state exists, 
then there is an interior solution to the corresponding non-stochastic model.  Further, 
provided the shocks are small enough to maintain the linear approximation, we have 
found an interior solution to the stochastic problem as well.  Second, a consequence of 
linearizing the model is that the disturbance terms in (10) are proportional to the demand 
shock  ˆt ε .  This implies that the unconditional price distribution will be symmetric if the 
demand shock distribution is symmetric.  This need not be the case for a non-linearized 
model, as our simulations will demonstrate. 
 
 
  11Example 
We provide an example to show that an economically reasonable determinate case 
exists, and to give additional intuition for the preceding results.  For simplicity, we adopt 
the following linear specification of the inverse demand function, 
  1 (, ) tt t t t p Dn q cn q ε ε = =−  (11) 
where c  and  1 0 > t ε  is i.i.d. with mean   and variance  0 0 c >
2 σ .  For the growth function, 
we specify, 
0 () gx g x
θ = + , 
where   is the timber growth with zero stock and  0 0 g ≥ θ  captures the curvature of the 
growth function. 
With the functional forms specified above, there are seven structural parameters 
in our model.  We assign the following values to these parmeters:   0.95 β = ,  ,  0 10 g =
0.1 θ = ,  ,  ,  , and  0 10 c = 1 0.8 c =
2 1 σ = 1 n = .  The steady-state values are then  2.04 x = , 
11.07 q = ,  1.14 p = , and  13.11 s = .
5  Thus, we see that there exists an economically 
reasonable steady-state with positive prices, quantities, and stock levels.  We can then 
compute the reduced-form parameters of the model in (7):   0.045 α = − ,  1 1.05 γ = , and 
2 0.7 γ = .  Following the procedure described in the Appendix, we obtain the stationary 
ARMA(1,1) process defined by, 
  11 ˆˆ ˆ 0.86 0.31 0.04 tt t pp ˆ t µ µ −− =−+ . (12) 
                                                 
5 Lowering the mean intercept to c0=5 shifts the demand curve far enough inward so that the equilibrium 
price level is negative and, thus, the associated steady-state is not reasonable. 
  12Given the assumed parameter values, the price expression in (12) completely 
characterizes the REE of our model. 
 
Simulation of an Efficient Timber Market with Multiple Timber Age Classes 
In this section,  we simulate the infinite-horizon REE using an age-class model of 
the timber inventory commonly applied in the forestry literature.  In the model, the fixed 
amount of land dedicated to timber production is normalized to one, and allocated across 
six timber age classes.  The volume of timber per unit land (v ), beginning with age class 
1, is 1.0, 2.2, 3.35, 4.45, 5.5, and 6.5.
j
6  Thus, growth is concave, as timber grows by 1.2 
units from age 1 to age 2, by 1.15 units from age 2 to age 3, and so on.  At age 6, timber 
obtains old-growth status, in the sense that it no longer grows.  With the total land in 








=− ∑ , 
and so the state of the forest is fully described by the amount of land in each of the age 
classes 2 through 6. 
Over time timber grows from one age class to the next, unless it is cut, in which 
case it reverts to age class 1, or unless it attains old growth status, in which case it 
remains in age class 6 until harvested.  Formally, then, the state of the forest evolves 
according to the following system, where   is the amount of land in age class j 
harvested at time t: 
jt h
                                                 
6 The results are robust to other representations of the timber growth function. 





2, 1 1 1 1
2
, 1 1, 1,






tt t j t
j
j t jt jt
tt t t t
ll
ll h l h
ll hj















with initial conditions on land, 















and with the harvested land in each age class constrained to be positive and less than the 
total land in the age class: 
   .  (15)  01 jt jt h l j ,..., t ≤≤ = ∀
This last condition permits the harvest of all the timber in an age class, as well as all 
timber in all age classes.  As such, we broaden the focus of the theoretical model to 
consider corner, in addition to interior, solutions of the model.  
Whereas in the theoretical analysis the state of the forest is completely described 
by the stock of timber, here the stock of timber is not sufficient to identify the state of the 
forest; there is an infinite number of ways to arrange the age structure of the forest to 
obtain a given stock of standing timber.  With the above notation, the total stock of 








  14The demand for timber takes the form in (11) with cn 1 1 = = , where  t q  is the aggregate 







=∑ t j v t ε  is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution with 
values ranging from 9.6 to 10.4 in increments of 0.1.   
In a competitive timber market, REE prices are those that maximize the expected 
discounted value of timber.  Formally, we define  ( )
6
2 tj t j l
= = l  as the vector of land state 
variables;  as the vector of land areas harvested at time t;  ()
6
1 tj t j h
= = h ( tt w, ) ε l  as the 
state-dependent value of the forest at time t, given optimal decisions are made; and β  as 
the discount factor (in the simulation,  1 1 05 /. β = ).  Then REE prices are found by 
solving the infinite-horizon problem, 





tt t t t t t t w, m a x q q E w , εε β ε ++ )
  =− +     h ll , (16) 
subject to (13)-(15). 
With the value function  ( ) tt w, ε l  unknown, solving for the infinite-horizon REE 
price function for a model such as this one involves the solution of a stochastic dynamic 
programming (SDP) problem with J state variables:  J-1 variables describing the state of 
the forest, and the disturbance term ε .  An obvious obstacle to numerically solving for 
REE prices is the so-called curse of dimensionality—the size of the programming 
problem increases exponentially as the number of variables in the state space increases 
linearly.  Our choice of six age classes strikes a balance between complexity—in 
particular, having enough age classes so that the concavity of timber growth comes into 
play—and computational ease.   
  15It is important to emphasize that, in the algorithm discussed below, we 
approximate the derivatives of  ( ) tt w, ε l , rather than in  ( ) tt w, ε l  itself, because good 
approximations of a function obtained from discrete methods often yield poor 
approximations of the function’s derivatives, and, as revealed below, REE prices are 
tightly bound to the derivatives of  ( ) t t w, ε l .  With this in mind, the solution algorithm 




























 ∂  −− + = = 
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jt ρ  and 
2
jt ρ  are Lagrange multipliers associated with constraint (15), and the time 
subscript on w indexes the state at which the derivative is evaluated.  The adjoint 
equations are:  
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 ∂∂ ∂  =+ − 
∂∂ ∂  
, 5
 (18) 
Details on the solution algorithm are provided in Appendix B. 
Figure 1 presents a typical 100-year sequence of REE prices from the model.  
Consistent with the results of the theoretical model, this price sequence exhibits the 
classical symptoms of a stationary, serially-correlated price series:  prices cross the long-
term mean price (8.89, denoted by the red-dashed line) frequently and some persistence 
in the price level is evident.  We fit the AR(1) model, 
  1601 1 tt pdd p t η − = ++ , 
to a sequence of five thousand prices.  This yields parameter values   and 
 with standard errors 0.119 and 0.0134, respectively, and an estimated standard 
deviation of 
0 5.95 d =
1 0.331 d =
η equal to 0.405.  The coefficient on lagged price suggests a stationary 
process with a modest degree of serial dependence.  We present these results purely for 
descriptive purposes.  Below, we discuss a number of challenging econometric issues that 
arise with the estimation of ARMA models of timber prices. 
As noted above, our timber model is similar to models of optimal commodity 
storage (e.g., Williams and Wright, 1991), except that these models typically assume the 
stock depreciates at a constant rate.  An important result from this literature is that price 
changes are asymmetric:  positive changes above the mean (spikes) tend to be larger in 
absolute value than negative changes below the mean (troughs).  This asymmetry results 
from periodic stock-outs.  When there is a positive demand shock (or negative supply 
shock) and a stock-out occurs, price arbitrage cannot moderate increases in the current 
price due to the impossibility of drawing on future stocks.  In contrast, during periods of 
low demand when stock-outs do not occur, price declines are cushioned by carrying 
inventory forward to the future.   
In our simulations, stock-outs never occur in a simulation of 10,000 periods.  This 
accurately reflects the situation on the ground—the depletion of the timber inventory 
would never arise in the U.S. market, nor in most foreign markets.  Yet, despite the 
absence of stock-outs, our simulated timber prices display the same asymmetric pattern 
of high peaks and low troughs.  Figure 1 suggests that prices are right-skewed:  prices are 
usually below average.  This is confirmed in Figure 2, which presents the estimated 
  17unconditional probability density function for prices in the simulation model.  The 
function was obtained via kernel density estimation using a normal kernel and the 
approximately optimal bandwidth described by Silverman (1986).  The estimation 
involved 1000 prices, each of which was generated as the terminal price of a 500-period 
simulation, with the initial state of the forest chosen randomly.  The null hypothesis of no 
skew in the distribution is rejected at the 1% level. 
For timber, then, the explanation of asymmetric prices in an efficient market 
subject to symmetric shocks is not stock-outs per se, yet the fundamentals of the 
explanation are the same as in the storage literature.  Essentially, there are “stock-outs” of 
slower-growing timber in the oldest age classes.  When the older timber stock is depleted 
during periods of high demand, owners of younger, faster-growing timber may withhold 
timber from the market, preferring to forego high prices in the current period for the high 
growth in their timber.  In contrast, during periods with low demand and a relative 
abundance of old timber, owners of older, slower-growing timber are more willing to 
supply in the current period because the opportunity cost of doing so is lower. 
We demonstrate this dependence of prices on the stock level by plotting the 
difference between  1 t p +  and  t p  against the stock level   for a typical 1,000-year 
sequence of prices (Figure 3).  Note, first, that prices are more volatile at low stocks than 
at high stocks, even though stock-outs never arise.
t s
7  Second, when stocks are low, prices 
at time t+1 are more likely to be lower than prices at time t (the price difference is less 
than zero).  This is because when stocks are low, the only timber remaining is the fast-
                                                 
7 A stock-out is implied by a stock level of 1.0, which indicates that the entire forest is in stand age 1 (recall 
that the forest area is normalized to unity, and the volume of timber in stand age 1 is 1.0 per unit area).  
This is possible only if all stock in the previous period was harvested.  The minimum stock in the 1000-
year sequence is 1.364. 
  18growing timber in the younger age classes, and the owners of this timber are willing to 
forego a high current price for a lower price in the future, in order to reap the benefits of 
relatively high timber growth.  Note, too, that when stocks are high, the reverse 
relationship holds: prices are more likely to be higher in period t+1 than in period t (the 
price difference is greater than zero).  When stocks are high, a large amount of timber is 
in older, slower-growing timber.  The owners of this timber are willing to sell at a low 
price—foregoing the opportunity to fetch a higher price by postponing harvest—in order 
to move their land into younger, faster-growing trees. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The key result from our theoretical model is that stationary serially-correlated 
prices can arise in an efficient timber market even when market shocks are i.i.d.  Before 
we can explore the implications of this result for the optimal harvesting literature, we 
must be clear about the meaning of “efficient market.”  The notion of an efficient market 
is frequently associated with Eugene Fama.  In an influential paper, Fama (1970) 
attempts to formalize the idea that efficient markets fully reflect available information by 
requiring the forecast errors to form a martingale difference sequence.  More specifically, 
he says the price process  t p  is efficient with respect to the information sets  t I  if  
  11 ttt 1 t x pE p + ++ = −  (19) 
satisfies  , where  1 0 tt Ex+ = ( ) () t EE I ⋅= ⋅ t .  Various forms of efficiency differ according 
to the content of the information set; for example, weak-form efficiency refers to the case 
in which  t I  contains exactly the history of past prices.  Unfortunately, this formal 
definition is of little use.  As LeRoy (1989) notes, Fama’s definition is a tautology and 
  19hence has no meaningful implications.  To see this, simply apply the expectations 
operator to both sides of (19) and note that  1 (( ) ) ( ) ttt tt EEp Ep + 1 + =  from the law of 
iterated expectations. 
t I
In a subsequent paper that attempts to address these difficulties, Fama (1976) 
offers the following alternative:  a market is efficient if agents are rational and use all 
relevant available information to form expectations.  A slightly more formal statement is 
that a market is efficient with respect to the information sets   provided agents form 
their expectations mathematically conditional on these information sets.  Note, then, that 
any rational expectations equilibrium is efficient with respect to the information set 
imposed by the model.  In particular, the ARMA(1,1) price process derived from our 
theoretical model is efficient with respect to the information set containing all past values 
of prices and shocks.  It is important to keep in mind that these prices are an equilibrium 
result of rational, optimizing behavior.  Thus, even if prices are serially correlated, as in 
(12), there is no scope for agents to earn even higher returns by exploiting stochastic 
price variations.  While this statement may seem at odds with the central conclusion of 
the optimal harvesting literature, it should be remembered that the point of comparison in 
these studies is a myopic Faustmann rule.  In an efficient market, agents cannot generate 
higher returns because all relevant information about the structure of the market is 
already incorporated into their decision calculus.   
As noted above, authors of previous studies have motivated the selection of non-
stationary random walk processes for timber prices on the grounds that such prices are 
consistent with an efficient timber market.  One finds a source for this claim in Fama 
(1970):  “… it is best to regard the random walk model as an extension of the general … 
  20efficient markets model in the sense of making a more detailed statement of the economic 
environment.”  However, our results show that market efficiency provides little 
justification, at least in the case of timber markets, for random walk prices.  The ARMA 
(1,1) process derived above represents efficient prices and may be stationary depending 
on the values of model parameters.  In our example, we show that a stationary process 
can be obtained with economically reasonable choices of parameters.  Of course, there is 
no reason to think that an efficient market cannot also produce non-stationary prices.  
Thus, market efficiency alone provides little guidance for the specification of a price 
process. 
A similar critique applies to studies that use time-series data on timber prices to 
test for the efficiency of timber markets (Washburn and Binkley, 1990; Haight and 
Holmes, 1991; Hultkrantz, 1993; Yin and Newman, 1995; Abildtrup et al., 1997).  These 
studies focus on weak-form efficiency; that is, efficiency is defined with respect to the 
information set containing past prices.  The general approach is to apply Dickey-Fuller 
unit root tests to historical price series, where failure to reject the unit root (indicating 
non-stationarity) is taken as evidence of market efficiency.
8  In its simplest form, the 
Dickey-Fuller test requires estimation of, 
  01 1 tt pbb p t ε − ∆ =+ + (20) 
where  t p  is the logged price in time t,  1 tt t p pp − ∆ =− , b  and    are model parameters, 
and 
0 1 b
t ε  is a normally distributed disturbance term with zero mean.
9  The null hypothesis is 
                                                 
8 The test in Washburn and Binkley (1990) has a slightly different form; see their reply (Washburn and 
Binkley, 1993) to the comment by Hultkrantz (1993). 
9 Haight and Holmes, Yin and Newman, and Abildtrup et al. also include lagged, first-differenced price 
terms, which accommodates a more complicated moving average error structure (this is an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test).  The null hypothesis for this version of the model is also  1 0 b = .  
  211 0 b = , implying that prices follow a random walk process with drift rate  .  In most of 
the timber price studies, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.  Our results suggest, 
however, that a finding of stationarity does not distinguish between efficient and 
inefficient markets.  For the ARMA(1,1) process in (12), b
0 b
1 0.14 = .  For the simulated 
prices series discussed in the previous section, b1 0.67 = .  Thus, we see that rejection of 
the unit root should not be accepted as evidence of market inefficiency.  Nor should it be 
viewed as evidence of efficiency since there is no reason to think that inefficient markets 
cannot generate stationary prices. 
A key insight provided by the simulations is that the concavity of the timber 
growth function may give rise to an asymmetric unconditional price distribution.  If 
prices are modeled as an ARMA(p,q), then the asymmetry of the unconditional price 
distribution implies that the disturbance term in the econometric model is asymmetric as 
well.
10  In earlier studies, researchers who fit empirical models to historical price series 
have assumed symmetric errors.  While an incorrect assumption of symmetric 
disturbances will not bias least squares coefficient estimates, it can produce sub-optimal 
harvesting rules.  In particular, under an assumption of symmetric prices, landowners will 
tend to regard high prices as a rarer event than they actually are.  Thus, landowners will 
be induced to harvest in cases where postponing the harvest decision is optimal. 
The discussion thus far would appear to argue the case for empirically-based 
models of timber prices, provided appropriate attention is paid to the structure of the error 
                                                 
10 For an ARMA(p,q) process with symmetric disturbances, it can be shown that the unconditional price 
distribution is symmetric.  The proof involves rewriting the right-hand side of the ARMA model as a linear 
combination of disturbances and then showing that a linear combination of symmetric disturbances is itself 
symmetric.  It follows, therefore, that if the unconditional price distribution is asymmetric, then the 
disturbance term in the ARMA price model is asymmetric. 
  22terms.  However, it must be recognized that not all REEs can be represented as ARMA 
processes.  That it could in the model analyzed above is a consequence of the simple 
stock dynamics in (2).  If multiple stock variables are required to represent the timber 
inventory, as with the age-class model considered in the simulations, then the solution 
cannot be represented by a single equation.  In general, a system of equations (a vector 
autoregressive moving average model, or VARMA) that includes stock variables in 
addition to prices and shocks will need to estimated.  Given the heterogeneity of timber 
resources, such models could be difficult to estimate and apply to actual harvesting 
decisions.  Thus, future research might compare the performance of simple models of 
timber prices to models providing a more complex representation of market equilibria. 
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Figure 2.  Estimated Unconditional Probability Density Function of REE Prices
 
 




























  28Appendix A 
 
In this appendix, we obtain the REE of the reduced-form model in (7).  For 
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or, more compactly,  1 tt t Hy FE y η + =
t y
+ .  Recall that a martingale difference sequence is 
any stochastic process   that satisfies  1 0 tt Ey+ = .  Now define the forecast error as the 2-
vector  1 ttt yEt y ξ − =− .  Because agents in the model are assumed to be rational, the 
expectations operator is the conditional expectations operator (in particular, the 
information set includes the structural equations (5) and (6)).  It follows from the law of 
iterated expectations that  t ξ  is a martingale difference sequence.  Furthermore, because 
1 t x + %
t
 is known at time t,  .  Thus, the forecast error for the second element of  1 ˆ () tt t Ex x + = %
ξ  is zero; that is,  2, 1 1 1 ttt t xE x0 ξ ++ + =− %% = . 




11 tt t yF H y F t η ξ
−−
−− = −+ . (A1) 
 
We may conclude that if   is a REE, then there exists a martingale difference sequence  t y
t ξ  with  2, 0 t ξ =  so that   satisfies (A1).  On the other hand, it may not be the case that 
any such martingale difference sequence yields an REE.  To more precisely determine the 
number and nature of the equilibria, we now analyze which martingale difference 
sequences yield reasonable solutions to (A1). 
t y
The linearization technique used to obtain (5) and (6) requires us to focus on 
(asymptotically) stationary equilibria, and for obvious reasons.  If the equilibrium is non-
stationary, the process will tend to drift away from the steady-state and, thus, from the 
neighborhood in which the linearization applies.  Even near a steady-state there may exist 
many stationary REE.  The steady-state is determinate if there is associated a unique 
stationary REE; if many exist the steady-state is indeterminate and if none exist it is 
explosive.  Whether or not our steady-state is determinate will depend on the modulus of 
the eigenvalues  i λ  of the matrix  .  This dependence is most easily seen by stacking 
our potential REE (A1) in VAR form.  We write 
1 FH
−
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  '
'
1 ˆ [, ] tt t wG w t ξ µ − =+ . (A2) 
 
It is straightforward to show that G is diagonalizable with eigenvalues  i λ  and zero, and 
so we write GS , where S is the matrix of eigenvectors and 
1 S
− =Λ 12 [, , 0 ] Diag λ λ Λ = .  








1 ˆ [, ] tt t zz S ξ µ
−
− =Λ + . (A3) 
 
We see now that if both eigenvalues lie in the unit circle then for any martingale 
difference sequence,  1,t ξ , the resulting VAR is stationary (in this case,   and   are 
first-order autoregressive processes with coefficients on the lagged variables less than 
one).  This is the indeterminate case and the associated martingale difference sequences 
are sometimes referred to as sunspots.  We also see that if both eigenvalues lie outside the 
unit circle, then for any 
1,t z 2,t z
1,t ξ  the result VAR is explosive.  In this case, the process would 
tend to move away from the steady-state and the non-linear dynamics of the model would 
come into play. Finally, if one eigenvalue is in the unit circle and one is outside, the 
determinate case obtains; there is a unique martingale difference sequence for which (A3) 
is stationary and the associated dynamics of   take place entirely in the contracting 
eigenspace.  Proposition 1 characterizes the regions of the parameter space corresponding 
to these types of steady-states; see text equation (8).
t w
11 
We will assume that the reduced-form parameters satisfy (8) and, without loss of 
generality, that  1 1 λ >  and  2 1 λ < .  Stationarity of (A3) then requires that   and  1, 0 t z =
11 13
1, ˆ t SS t ξ µ =− , where   is the ij-component of S
ij S























Equation (9) is derived from (A4) by defining  ,  , replacing  
12 11
1 / SS φ =−
13 11
2 / SS φ =−
t x %  with  1 ˆt x − , and moving the second equation forward by one period. 
 
                                                 
11 This method of obtaining the REE is discussed extensively in Evans and McGough (2002). 
  30Appendix B 
 
In this appendix, we provide details on the algorithm for solving the simulation 
model.  The algorithm involves three steps.  
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l
 approximated from 
the previous iteration (initially these functions are identically equal to zero), for each grid 
point in the state space a search across harvest volumes is made to find the harvest 
decision h satisfying the six necessary conditions.  This search exploits the structure of 
the problem; namely, that because the rate of growth of timber declines with stand age, 
harvest must proceed monotonically from age class six to age class one.  So long as 
some, but not all, timber is harvested, the solution is characterized by the result that  
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h  (B1) 
 
for the age class j for which the acreage harvested is an interior solution ( ) or a 
degenerate corner solution (i.e., both B1 holds and 
0 j hl << j
1 0 ρ = ).  Otherwise, the equilibrium 
price is found from the inverse demand function with all timber stock consumed.  The 
solution is thus quickly bracketed within an age class, and quasi-Newton methods are 
then used to find the solution to (B1) for the candidate age class.       
 
2.  Given the solution of the problem in step 1 at all of the state grid points, the solution 
values of 
1







.  Taking the 
expectation of these values over the disturbance term yields new approximations of the 










                                                
 at the grid points.  To these grid points a 5-dimensional 
Chebyshev polynomial of order five is fit (note, then, that the grid points are the 
Chebyshev nodes).
12  In summary, the outcome at each iteration of the algorithm is a set 
of approximations of the five expected marginal value functions, each approximation 
being a five-dimensional Chebyshev polynomial. 
  The advantage of using Chebyshev polynomials to approximate functions is well-
documented in Miranda and Fackler (2002).  Not only do Chebyshev polynomials satisfy 
certain minimax theorems of approximation (theorems concerned with whether a 
polynomial minimizes the maximum approximation error), but coefficients of the 
polynomials are obtained by exceptionally rapid algorithms. 
 
12 We also fit a polynomial of order seven and found little effect on the results. 
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terminates when the new approximations of equilibrium prices,  ( ) ,,
REE pq εε h , defined 
in (B1),  are “close enough” to the old approximations.
13  Sequences of REE prices are 
then generated by substituting sequences of random draws from the distribution of 
demand shocks into the final version of (17) and solving for the REE prices, using the 
state equations (13) to update the state of the forest.     
 
                                                 
13 The convergence criterion used in the algorithm is that at each grid point, prices are within 1.0
-5 percent 
of their values in the previous iteration. 
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